Before entering into the class dynamic of the current world economic situation, let us consider the manifestations of crisis on the visible surface, which are real enough.

The world is still in the early phase of an inflationary blow-out centered on the indebted “U.S. consumer” as the “locomotive” of the world economy.

Every indicator in the world economy today points to a reflation-driven boom that can ultimately be traced back to credit expansion in the U.S., generalized to the world by the unbelievable levels of U.S. balance-of-payments deficits. When this world-wide Ponzi scheme unravels, the Asian export giants (Japan, Korea, China) will go into the tank with the U.S., as will the Third World raw materials producers (e.g. Latin America) currently enjoying a boom from exports to Asia, above all China.

The parallels with the  the early 1970’s, just prior to the 1973-1979 inflationary surge, are uncanny:

  • -the U.S. bogged down in a losing, unpopular war (Vietnam
    then, Iraq now)
  • -a scandal-ridden, foundering Republican
    administration (Nixon then, Bush now)
  • -all commodity prices headed skyward, led by gold and
    oil
  • -a lingering “boom”  mentality in the
    U.S. mainstream (the Dow Jones Industrial Average hitting finally regaining the peak levels of early 2000, just before the dot.com
    crash; in fact, the U.S. stock market has gone exactly nowhere for six years, and has gone backward when inflation is factored in.)
  • -unbelievable run-up of consumer (and all kinds of)
    debt in the U.S.
  • -a faltering dollar and growing uneasiness of the U.S.’s
    international creditors, who have made the above
    run-up of debt possible.

These parallels are not mere empirical coincidence, but point to an “invariant” in world accumulation since the late 1950’s when the worldwide “dollar standard” first began to erode. By definition, every U.S. “expansion” since 1958 has brought about a decline in America’s international position, and has only been possible through such a decline. (This is what Michael Hudson, in his excellent book Super-Imperialism, calls “managing empire through bankruptcy”. )

A brief look at basic economic realities shows this erosion has continued unabated. As of the end of 2005, there was  $33 trillion in outstanding debt (Federal, state, local, corporate, personal) in the U.S. economy, three times GDP. (No one knows how much is tied up in the international hedge funds and derivatives, and the estimated $7-8 trillion in Federal debt does not include trillions more in commitments for Social Security and Medicare.)  The state (including Federal, state and local levels) consumes 40% of GDP. The net U.S. debt abroad is between $3 and $4 trillion (at least $11 trillion held by foreigners minus $8 trillion in U.S. assets abroad) i.e. it is comparable (at 30% of GDP) to the situation of crisis-ridden Third World countries.  That amount is growing by $800 billion a year at current rates. Ominously, in late 2005, foreign income from investment in the U.S. exceeded U.S. income from overseas investment (the one remaining strong pillar of the U.S. international position) for the first time. Foreigners hold an increasing percent of U.S. government debt; the four major Asian central banks (Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan) alone hold nearly $2 trillion.  It is the Federal government’s debt, and hence these foreign loans, which make possible the reflationary actions of the Federal Reserve Bank. Since the early 1980’s, a kind of  “financial arbitrage capitalism”, in which investment in increasingly focused on different possible financial instruments instead of production, has been put in place.  Thus the old conceptualization of the role of the banking system and the Fed’s (apparent) ability to expand and contract credit availability through it,  is superseded;  increasing amounts of “virtual” credit are created by “securitized finance” independent of banks. One must also consider the government-linked entities (Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae), which backed the reflation of mortgages of the past 4 years, leading to an incredible housing bubble. This entire edifice has depended on 1) low inflation in the U.S., as higher inflation would scare off foreign lenders; 2) the willingness of U.S,  “consumers” to go more and more heavily into debt (with debt service now taking 14% of incomes, as opposed to 11% a few years ago) 3) the willingness and ability and above all the need of foreigners to go on re-lending U.S. balance-of-payments deficits back to the U.S., allowing increasingly indebted U.S. “consumers” to be the “locomotive” of the world economy.

Constantly relending money to an ever-more indebted borrower to delay the latter’s bankruptcy is the very definition of a “Ponzi scheme”, and that is what world accumulation has come to.

There are of course important discontinuities with the early 1970’s. The U.S. strategy of a “global leveraged buyout” of previously protected or semi-protected regions (the ex-Soviet bloc, China, India, East Asia, Europe) is much more advanced, bringing more than two billion people into a global work force far less sheltered behind previous national barriers to looting. This reality is having a major downward pull on wages, as outsourcing from the U.S. and Europe to these new zones (China, India, Eastern Europe) accelerates.

The early 1970’s was the final phase of the last worldwide working-class  upsurge, against which the entire post-1973 period must be understood as a conscious counter-offensive. It took the worldwide working-class movement nearly three decades to learn how to struggle offensively on the new terrain of neo-liberalism, and the new wave of struggles can be dated from the 1997 UPS strike in the U.S. and the Seattle anti-globalization riot of 1999, against which Sept. 11 marked a major turning point in capitalist, above all American counter-strategy.  More recently, this new recomposition of the working class can be seen in a palpable strike wave in western Europe or, most recently,  the May 1 mobilization of the Latino working class in the U.S. over immigrant rights.

It is true that Chinese exports are exerting a deflationary drag globally, which is different from the 1970’s. But wages are rapidly rising in Shenzhen and in Guandong province to attract workers, and Bangladesh has now edged out China as the low-wage champion of the Third World. Further, the relentless boom in China is pulling up all commodity prices by its seemingly bottomless demand for raw materials, now spreading the boom to Latin America, and to African oil producers.

Last but not least, one must not forget geopolitical dislocation, led by the brewing Iran crisis, one of several dimensions that takes the preceding out of purely economic considerations.

One plausible counter-scenario to the preceding is the downward turn of the U.S. housing market, now underway, plunges the U.S. (and, by a fall-off of U.S. demand, the world) into a deflationary crash faster than otherwise anticipate. In my opinion, the Federal Reserve Bank will not allow this to happen without first pulling out all stops on reflation with the famous “helicopter money” theorized by its new chairman, Benjamin Bernanke. True, the Fed is hardly omnipotent and there would be a huge run out of the dollar, forcing a rapid rise in U.S. interest rates, which would in turn further act to kill off the housing bubble. For the moment, all the capitalists can do is continue expanding the debt pyramid, and intensify their attacks on the working class.

What is a “global leveraged buyout”? Accumulation is threatened because the totality of capitalist paper claims to wealth (profit, interest and ground rent), starting with the $3-4 trillion “nomad dollars” held outside the U.S.,  exceed the surplus value available for their valorization. This excess of fictitious claims is, as sketched above, the result of decades of debt pyramiding aimed at delaying a deflationary crisis, and can be maintained only by reducing the global wage and through “primitive accumulation” (non-reproduction or non-exchange) from incorporating petty producers from Third World agriculture into the global working class, the running down of capital plant and infrastructure, and the looting of nature. It is quite different from earlier, “normal” capitalist expansions in which these claims grow alongside the expanded reproduction of society. Today, capitalist paper expands and social reproduction contracts.

Global leveraged buyout has meant, since 1973, opening national or regional zones of assets to the U.S.-centered credit bubble, much in the same way that Germany’s military expansion after 1938 aimed at  propping up the 1933-1938 credit pyramid created by Hjalmar Schacht’s “Mefo bill” (Mefowechsel, issued by the Metallforschungsgesellschaft which financed German rearmament)  .In the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, for example, American capital, through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) opened relatively closed Asian economies such as Korea to “vulture capitalist” buyouts of greatly discounted real assets which were later restructured and resold at a significant profit. The opening of the ex-Soviet bloc, China and India presents the global leveraged buyout with tremendous possibilities of exploiting highly-educated, cheap labor power and natural resources which might keep this process going for years. Behind these empirical manifestations we see the classic cycle of valorization- devalorization- revalorization described in vol. III of Marx’s Capital.

Two major powers, the European Union and China,  represent obstacles to America’s strategy of global leveraged buyout. Both are vulnerable to America’s current dominance of world petroleum resources, and are increasingly challenging the U.S. in the worldwide race to control them, from disagreements over Iran to the competition for new oil sources in Africa.

Europe is far from being able to challenge the U.S. Because capital is not merely an economic and social relationship but also a political and military one, history has shown that monetary and economic union without political unification is unviable, and Europe’s political unification is currently dead in the water.

Consider the euro’s challenge to the dollar as an international reserve currency. While Europe’s net global position, both in trade and finance,  has none of the problems of  the foreign indebtedness of the U.S., a worldwide flight from the dollar would strongly revalue the euro and weigh heavily on Europe’s international competitive position. (This already alarmed the European capitalists with the post-2002 rise of the euro to .80 to the dollar, a 40% revaluation in 18 months.) But this problem would pale next to a major Mideast crisis that threatened Europe’s access to oil, to say nothing of a military confrontation (of which the Yugoslav wars were an excellent foretaste) that would reveal Europe’s profound disarray in foreign and military policy.

China is in fact the real problem for U.S. world hegemony, as recent CIA reports have frankly stated. Sometimes it seems as if all U.S. foreign policy since at least the late 1970’s (e.g. Afghanistan) has been aimed at controlling the periphery of Russia and China, and since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the encirclement of China. The emergence of an East Asian capitalist bloc capable of replacing the U.S. as the world hegemon is the nightmare of American capital. China, in contrast to the European Union, is still too closed for the capitalists’ satisfaction, and “global leveraged buyout” there is still in its early stages. Asian nationalisms (China, Korea, Japan) as well as the lingering Cold War questions (Taiwan, the division of Korea) are still major obstacles to anything resembling an “Asian Union”, but the U.S. is using every means in its power to stoke these fires and prevent such a union from forming.

In the currently accelerating world reflation, Germany and Japan, the two previous “locomotives” of Europe and East Asia respectively, recently eclipsed by the creation of the euro and the rise of China, are showing the highest “capitalist confidence” in 15 years. But both countries are highly vulnerable to the rising international interest rates necessary to control the return of inflation, as well as to the currency revaluation mentioned previously. In early May, the European Central Bank avoided raising interest rates both to prevent such a revaluation and to avoid choking off signs of recovery, particularly in Germany.

Both countries (and particularly Japan) also show signs of the “demographic crisis” touted in the capitalist press around the incipient pension bankruptcy. The recent capitalist hue and cry over this crisis could not be more hypocritical. Within a capitalist framework, this crisis only exists because the restructuring of the past 30 years has narrowed the “active population” (i.e. the population capable of producing surplus value) to people between the ages of 25 and 50. France, for example, has in recent years seen the gamut of excluded or potentially excluded groups struggle against this downsizing: public employees went into the streets over pensions (May-June 2003), immigrant youth rioted over their total exclusion and criminalization (November 2005) and most recently students struck for two months (March-April 2006) to prevent the gutting of labor protection for young people. The retired, the unemployable and the  soon-to-be-exploited have all moved, while the surplus-value producing population, the group with the greatest power to resist capital,  has remained largely immobile.

The “demographic crisis” exists only because of the demands of capitalist valorization. It expresses the fact that productive forces exist today which could enable a higher form of society to both greatly decrease socially-necessary labor and to transform the remaining necessary labor into the

“…development of the rich individuality which is as all-sided in its production as in its consumption, and whose labor also therefore no longers appears as labor, but as the full development of activity itself…” (Marx, Grundisse)

Further, the “demographic crisis” in Europe and Japan reflects the actual contraction of population (Japan has negative population growth in 2005, Germany has been close to zero growth) because of the greatly increased cost, in capitalist terms,  of reproducing the next generation.

Finally, on a world scale, there is no “demographic crisis” whatsoever. It is only a crisis because of the persistence of value production and of the nation-state. The crisis in the advanced capitalist sector since the early 1970’s has produced an aging population-for-capital, and the same crisis in the less-developed world has produced a huge young population (as among poor peasants, where a large family is indispensable for the elderly where no pensions exist). These complementary imbalances are only two signs of the same coin, the crisis of capital’s recomposition for a possible new expansion.

This brings us to the final dimension of the analysis. Why has capital, since the early 1970’s, had to resort to such fictitious development and launch such (at least in the U.S.) a class war in which only one side was fighting?

The early 1970’s crisis erupted, as mentioned, at the end of a period of rising working-class insurgency. Underneath all appearances, this crisis expressed the superannuation of value as a form through which society could reproduce itself. In the proletarian eruption in Europe and the U.S. from the mid-1960’s (wildcat movement in the U.S. and the U.K.) to the mid-1970’s (Italy, Portugal, Spain) by way of May 1968 in France, the working class (as well as other social strata) were groping toward the “full development of activity itself” made possible and necessary by the previous development of capitalism. The capitalists, on the other hand, needed to oversee a general devalorization of capital and of labor power such that a new expansion could begin on a profitable basis. In contrast to the first phase of capitalist history (1815-1914) this could not occur through a rapid deflation, depression and recovery. Global society was TOO productive for the value form, and hence not merely capitalist paper but actual productive forces, and above all labor power, had to be destroyed and rolled back, as had occurred in the 1914-1945 transition from British-centered to America-centered world accumulation. The emergence of the “neo-liberal” phase of capitalism in the late 1970’s was the attempt to protect the capitalist titles to profit, interest and ground rent from excessive devalorization through the global “Ponzi scheme” described previously, and at the same time to oversee a “slow-motion crash landing” in the grinding down of working-class living standards globally.

As a result, the world today is poised between the U.S. and East Asian centered phases of capitalist expansion. But the latter can only triumph by a far greater, more violent shakeout than has occurred to date. And like the early years of the last shakeout (1917-1921), before the new American dominance was in place, this is creating a new opening for the “old mole”, in which the old slogan “socialism or barbarism” will not be a romantic battle cry, but the most rigorous necessity.